INTRODUCTION
STANDARD CONTRACT THEORY involving a principal and agent assumes that the principal, who proposes the contract, has no relevant private information at the (ex-ante) contracting date. This assumption is too restrictive in many economic circumstances, as the following examples illustrate: 1 (Public good). A government trying to elicit consumers' preferences for a public good has private information about the cost of supplying the good. 2 (Procurement). The Department of Defense has special knowledge about a weapon's strategic value when dealing with a defense contractor. 3 (Managerial Compensation). A manager has private information about her ability when bargaining over incentive contracts with an employer. 4 (Insurance). A shipping company seeking insurance against collision with icebergs knows the probability of collision. 5 (Franchising). A manufacturer offering a franchising agreement to a new retailer has private access to data about future demand for the product. same choice and obtain the same utility whether or not he knows the principal's type. However, the principal can in general do even better than her full-information payoff by retaining some discretion at the contract execution stage.
In fact, the equilibrium outcomes of the three-stage game coincide with the Walrasian allocations of a fictitious economy in which the traders are the different types of principal and "exchange" the slack associated with the agent's individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. This characterization implies that equilibrium of the contract-proposal game exists, and is Pareto efficient (in a strong sense) and (locally) unique. Each type of principal is (generically, in the space of objective functions) strictly better off than under full information.
In this paper, we turn to common values. We retain the three-stage model of our previous paper but now assume that the principal's private information directly enters the agent's objective function. Conforming to most of the signaling literature, we assume that the agent has no private information (except in Section 8, where we consider two-sided uncertainty under the assumption that parties have quasi-linear preferences). Unlike her private-values counterpart, the principal in the common-values model may not be able to ensure her full-information payoff. In the Spence (1974) education model, for instance, a highly productive employee may be forced to invest in wasteful signaling activity (education) to avoid being mistaken for a less able employee. (Here, we are designating the employee as the contract proposer, i.e., as the principal). Our goal is to characterize the set of equilibrium contracts.
As in our earlier work, we define a contract very broadly: it is simply a game between the two parties, the outcomes of which are allocations. We endow the principal with all the bargaining power by having her propose the contract in the first period. The agent's expected payoff from the contract depends on his interim beliefs about the principal's type, where these beliefs are obtained by updating the agent's prior beliefs using the information conveyed by the contract proposal. Thus in the second stage, the agent accepts the contract if and only if his expected utility, given his interim beliefs, exceeds his expected reservation utility (his expected payoff if he refuses the contract). To be general, we allow reservation utility to be type contingent. Therefore its expectation must be computed using the interim beliefs about the principal's type.
If the agent refuses the principal's proposal, the game is over and players get their reservation utilities. If he accepts, the contract (which is itself a game) is then executed.4
In Section 3 we introduce the concept of weak interim Pareto efficiency. An allocation is weakly interim efficient (WIE) if it is incentive compatible (i.e., each type of principal prefers her allocation to that of any other type) and there exists no other such allocation that, regardless of the agent's beliefs about the principal's type, both parties prefer. A closely related concept is that of a Rothschild tion is RSW relative to the reservation allocation pJt if it maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive-compatible allocations that ensure the agent at least the utility he gets from ,ut no matter what his beliefs are. In Proposition 1 and its Corollary, we establish that any RSW allocation is WIE and that an WIE allocation is RSW relative to itself. We then show (Proposition 2) that RSW allocations have a simple structure when the principal's preferences satisfy a conventional sorting condition. The connection between WIE and ordinary interim efficiency is drawn in Propositions 3 and 4, where it is shown that any WIE allocation is interim efficient for some beliefs.
In Section 4 we present our main characterization result (Theorem 1), where we establish that the equilibrium set of our three-stage game consists of the incentive-compatible allocations that (weakly) Pareto dominate the RSW allocation relative to the reservation allocation. Therefore, the equilibrium of the contract proposal game is unique if and only if the RSW allocation is interim efficient. We apply Theorem 1 in Section 5 to contract negotiation when no prior contract binds the two parties (Propositions 6 and 7).
In Section 6 we turn to renegotiation. If the reservation allocation derives from a prior contract, that contract is weakly renegotiation-proof if there exists an equilibrium of the three-stage game in which it is not renegotiated. It is strongly renegotiation-proof if in no equilibrium is it renegotiated. Propositions 8 and 9 establish that weak and strong renegotiation-proofness correspond to WIE and interim efficiency respectively.
In Section 7, we compare the equilibrium set in the game of Sections 2 through 5, where the party with private information makes the contract proposal, to that where the uninformed party has (most of) this power. Proposition 12 shows that in the game where there are two uninformed parties who both propose a contract to a party with private information, there are many equilibria, including some that are Pareto dominated by the RSW allocation. When this game is modified to give some power to the informed party, however, the equilibrium set turns out to coincide with that of Theorem 1 (Proposition 13).
Section 8 extends most of our results to the case where the agent has private information, under the assumption that parties have quasi-linear preferences. Roughly speaking, our results extend to this case because, with quasi-linear preferences, the different types of principal do not gain by trading slack on the agent's individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints (see our companion paper Maskin-Tirole (1990a)), and so the agent's private information creates no additional complication. Finally, Section 9 compares our results with those of Myerson (1983) .
THE MODEL

A. Objective Functions and Information
There are two parties, a principal and an agent. The principal has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function VJ(y, t), where y, a vector of observable and verifiable actions,5 belongs to a compact, convex subset of R;fl; t is a monetary transfer (belonging to a compact interval) to the principal from the agent; and i denotes the principal's private information or type. The function Vi is continuously differentiable and concave in (y,t). The principal has a finite number of possible types i = 1,... , n, with prior probabilities 17H= {17i} such that i=1 H1 = 1. We shall assume that a type i indifference curve is nowhere tangent to a type j indifference curve (i : j). 6 The agent has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U1(y, t). The common-values assumption is embodied by making his utility depend on the principal's type i. We assume that Ui(y, t) is strictly increasing in i for almost all (y, t) (a higher i corresponds to a "better" type). It also is continuously differentiable and concave in (y, t).
We assume compactness and regularity in order to ensure that optimal contracts exist and are well-behaved as functions of the parameters. Occasionally, however, we will drop the restriction of y and t to compact sets and invoke the following standard assumption (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
(i) y is one-dimensional, and y and t can be any real number;
(ii) Uy > 0, and there exists E > 0 such that Vy1 < -e, V1 > 8, Ut/ < -E; (iii) for all numbers u and v there exists a (finite) solution to the program max Vi(y, t) subject to v > V'-1(y, t) and Ui(y, t) > ui; (iv) (Sorting) (-Vyl/Vt) > (-7Vy/lVt) for i < j.
As we will see below, condition (iii), together with the other parts of the Sorting Assumption, ensures that optimal contracts exist, despite the lack of compactness. It, in turn, is implied by the assumption that along any indifference curve, the agent's marginal rate of substitution -Uy1/Ut goes to zero as y -> oo, and goes to infinity as y -> -oo.
The following examples satisfy the Sorting Assumption (except possibly for a change of domain of y and t):
Managerial Compensation: In this example, t refers to the manager's compensation and y > 0 to her performance7 (e.g., output, profit, or cost reduction). the cross product of the action and transfer sets. That is, roughly speaking, ,u(y,t) represents the probability density of action y and transfer t. We will allow contracts to specify random outcomes ,u. To simplify the notation, we define for all i in (1, .. , n} V'(,)--V'( y, t) d,(y, t) and U'(1t ,)-Ui y, t) d1_ty,t) .
Note that Vi( ) and U'(i) are linear in /u.
DEFINITION:
An allocation is a menu ,u = {,}=1 of (possibly random) outcomes, one for each type of principal. Note that incentive compatibility and Pareto dominance are defined in reference to the principal's preferences only.
B. The Principal-Agent Game
Let us describe our three-stage game in detail. In the first stage the principal proposes a contract or mechanism in the feasible set M (we will use the words "contract" and "mechanism" interchangeably). A mechanism m in M specifies (i) a set of possible actions for each party and (ii) for each pair of moves sP and sa by the principal and agent, respectively, a corresponding measure ,u(, ) on the set of deterministic outcomes (y, t). Thus, a contract or mechanism is just a game form. The parties' actions can be thought of as announcements of payoff-irrelevant messages; the mechanism selects a (random) outcome conditional on these announcements. Observe that, because the principal can make announcements, she may be able to reveal information at the third stage (see below) as well as at the contract 'proposal stage. This fact will prove important in our analysis. In contrast, we will see that allowing the agent to make announcements does not affect the equilibrium set (when no prior contract is in effect-see Proposition 6), intuitively, because he has no private information to announce.8 8 Nevertheless, moves by the agent do play a role in our treatment of renegotiation. Specifically, they may enable the agent to "punish" the principal should she ever propose a new contract (see Proposition 8*).
We suppose that M consists of all finite simultaneous-action mechanisms9 (mechanisms where the players choose their actions simultaneously from finite sets). Notice that the set M includes the set of direct revelation mechanisms, (DRM's), in which the principal simply announces her type i, thus choosing from a "menu" (allocation) {pI}in l. We will make considerable use of these DRM's by repeatedly invoking the revelation principle for Bayesian games.10 In the present context this principle asserts that for any mechanism and for given beliefs at the time that mechanism is about to be played (i.e., after it has already been accepted), any equilibrium of the mechanism corresponds to a truthful equilibrium of a DRM.
In the second stage, the agent accepts or refuses the contract proposed by the principal. If he accepts, the two parties play the proposed mechanism in the third stage (for instance, the principal announces her type if the mechanism is a DRM), and the outcome corresponding to their third stage moves is implemented. The agent obtains his reservation utility if he rejects the contract. Thus, he will accept the proposed contract if and only if its expected utility exceeds the reservation level. The probabilities that he uses to compute expected utilities are the interim beliefs Hl = {17i})n1, obtained from the prior beliefs 17 by updating on the basis of the principal's proposal.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a vector of strategies1l-one for the agent and one for each type of principal-and a vector of beliefs at each point in the game tree (formally, at each information set) such that (i) the strategies are optimal'2 at each point in the game tree (sequential rationality), (ii) interim beliefs 17H(m) about the principal's type are the same at the beginning of the second stage as at the beginning of the third stage and are compatible with proposed offer m and the principal's presumed strategy (Bayesian updating), and (iii) given beliefs Hl (m) at the beginning of the third stage, the third stage probability assessments are consistent in the sense of Kreps-Wilson (1982) (consistency). In other words, given beliefs Hl (m), we require the continuation equilibrium beginning in stage 2 (after the principal has already proposed m) to be sequential.'3
The technical reason for requiring the mechanisms in M to be finite is to ensure that a continuation equilibrium in the third stage exists. The simultaneous-action assumption guarantees that the continuation equilibrium correspondence as a function of interim beliefs 17 is upper hemicontinuous (there can be 9 We shall discuss the reasons for restricting M in this way below.
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Note that by appealing to DRM's we are not suggesting that they are "realistic." What one typically sees in actual contracts is a schedule in which compensation (t) is tied to output (y). This is of course equivalent to a DRM.
11 These strategies for the overall game should not be confused with the equilibrium actions within the mechanism played at the third stage.
12 I.e., each type is maximizing expected utility given beliefs and the other types' strategies. 13 Moreover, our definition of an overall equilibrium is basically that of sequential equilibrium. However, the principal's strategy space in the first stage (the set of contracts) is necessarily infinite, and therefore consistency of beliefs between stages 1 and 2 is not well-defined. Thus we require only that Bayes' rule be used to obtain HI (m) when an equilibrium contract is proposed (condition (ii)). The reader can check that if the set of feasible contracts were restricted to a finite subset of M, our definition of equilibrium would coincide with that of sequential equilibrium. failures of upper hemicontinuity at points where H1 = 0 for some i if the principal moves before the agent in m). Without any changes in the formal arguments, we can expand M to include any other mechanisms for which existence and upper hemicontinuity hold.
As mentioned in the introduction, we will consider two different specifications of the agent's reservation utility:
No prior contract: In many applications, the agent's reservation utility is independent of the principal's type when no prior contract binds the two parties. However, our analysis can accommodate type-contingent reservation utility: Uo = U1(p10), where /4' is the exogenously given outcome that pertains should the agent reject the proposal by a principal of type i. One instance where reservation utilities are type-contingent is the franchising example, where the manufacturer can franchise a competing retailer if the agent turns down her proposal. In some applications, U0 may actually be decreasing in i. For example, a prospective licensee that turns down an exclusive licensing agreement for a process innovation could well be worse off the better the innovation if a rival then gets the license.
Renegotiation: In this case, it is supposed that the parties have signed an earlier contract that leads to allocation /,u and our contract proposal game can be thought of as a process of renegotiation. Because the allocation in which this process results might alternatively have been obtained by a more elaborate contract that is not renegotiated, our analysis of renegotiation will focus on characterizing the set of renegotiation-proof allocations.
In either case, we can assume without loss of generality that the reservation allocation ,I&O is incentive compatible.
To summarize, the principal's strategy in the three-stage game consists of a choice of mechanism and a choice of announcement (WP) in that mechanism. The agent's strategy consists of the decision to accept or reject the mechanism and a choice of announcement (sa) in the mechanism. Both of the agent's decisions are contingent on the mechanism proposed. We are interested in the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the overall game. Thus, in particular, we assume that the agent updates his beliefs about the principal's type using Bayes' rule after observing the contract she proposed. Similarly, we suppose that the principal revises her beliefs appropriately after observing that the agent has accepted the contract. In the continuation game of the third stage, there may, of course, be multiple equilibria. We suppose that the players can coordinate over these equilibria by means of some public randomizing device'4 such as a coin 14A randomizing device is "public" if its realizations are common knowledge. The technical reason for allowing public randomization is to ensure that the equilibrium payoff set of the continuation game is convex. We could alternatively allow (with no substantive change) players to use imperfect coordinating devices (different players observe different coin flips which are imperfectly correlated). Note that this randomization is in addition to that already built into the mechanism.
flip. If the coin turns up heads, they play one equilibrium; if tails, they play another. Thus, in the third stage, we permit (publicly) correlated equilibria.
Notice that in our model the values of both y and t are determined by the equilibrium contract. As noted earlier, this contrasts with some of the signaling literature (in particular, Spence (1974) ), where y is chosen before contracting. Our approach follows in the tradition of the screening literature, where all variables are contractually set.
EFFICIENCY CONCEPTS
A. Weakly Interim Efficient and RSWAllocations
A.1. General Definitions
The following efficiency concepts play a crucial role in the rest of the paper. Notice that, although they will help us characterize the equilibria of our model, they are defined without reference to any game. As we show in subsection B, weak interim efficiency is equivalent to ordinary interim efficiency relative to some beliefs. To motivate the introduction of WIE, suppose that the principal and agent are initially bound by a contract in which the principal has the discretion to choose from an incentive compatible allocation ,i = {f.}fl Then a necessary condition for all this allocation to be an equilibrium outcome of the three-stage proposal game-i.e., to be "renegotiation-proof'-is that the allocation be weakly interim efficient. Suppose instead that there exists a Pareto dominating allocation ,u satisfying (IC) and (IR1) for all i. Let the principal propose the contract that allows her to choose from the allocation ,.u= {1i}ln 1 (of course, if the proposal is rejected then she will choose from the allocation {f1}[n l). The agent can accept the renegotiation offer , without risk, because (IC) and (1R1) guarantee that, regardless of the principal's type, his utility will be at least as 15As Patrick Rey has pointed out to us, the set of WIE allocations gives rise to an n -1 dimensional, convex subset of the space of the utilities of the n types of principals. large as before. Moreover, at least one type of principal is better off making this proposal, so that the initial contract A-is not renegotiation-proof. Weakly interim efficient allocations thus play an important role in the characterization of renegotiation-proof allocations. That is, each type i maximizes her own utility within the set of allocations that are incentive compatible and, regardless of the principal's type, yields the agent at least his reservation utility.
It should be noted that an RSW allocation is defined by n independent optimizations, one for each type. From the continuity of the utility functions and the compactness of the domains, an RSW allocation exists. Clearly, the RSW payoffs VD(,UO) associated with a reservation allocation Au' are unique. The RSW allocation ,i (u) associated with Au' need not, in general, be unique but turns out to be so in many well-known models (e.g., those of Spence (1974), Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) , and Wilson (1977)). Henceforth, for expositional convenience only, we will simply assume that A,2(,u) is a unique allocation (see footnote 19 for conditions sufficient for uniqueness). We will also assume that A,(AuJ) is not on the boundary of the feasible set.'8
To understand the significance of this concept, imagine that the principal and agent have not previously signed a contract. Let AO denote the status-quo allocation if the principal's proposal is rejected. We claim that the principal of type i can guarantee herself v1( 0); she can simply propose the contract that gives her the discretion to choose from the menu that solves Program II' after the agent has accepted. Because of (IC) and (IRs ), the agent does not suffer from accepting the proposal whatever his beliefs are about the principal's type.
We thus conclude that only allocations where, for all i, the type i principal's payoff is no less than V1(0) are candidates for equilibrium of the contract proposal game. 16 We use the mnemonic term "RSW" allocation because, in the insurance model described above, this allocation is precisely the zero-profit separating allocation that figures prominently in Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) . 17 Notice that the set of allocations satisfying the constraints is nonempty since it includes A' itself.
18 This assumption is used in Proposition 5 only. If it is not satisfied, Proposition 5 still holds if neither of the two components (y, t) of the reservation outcome A' is on its respective boundary.
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
In some applications it is not the case that the type i principal's payoff is V'(A1 ) if the agent rejects the proposal. For example, Au'/ may correspond to an outcome that the agent achieves without the principal, in which case the principal gets (0,0), not A'4. Such a possibility creates no difficulty for our analysis, however, so long as V1(,u0) is at least as great as type i's payoff in the absence of a contract. Henceforth, we shall, for convenience, assume that this inequality holds. Of course, it holds automatically if A' really is the type i's outcome should the agent reject.
In our effort to characterize the equilibria of this game, we first show that an RSW allocation is incentive compatible and weakly interim efficient. The efficiency concepts defined in subsection A require that the agent's individual rationality constraint be satisfied for each type of principal. That is, they are "belief-free." We now relax this requirement and demand only that allocations satisfy the agent's IR constraint on average, where the average is computed using the interim beliefs. We thus allow some individual ( The first part of Proposition 4 tells us that, when the Sorting Assumption holds and an RSW allocation is deterministic, the set of beliefs relative to which it is interim efficient consists entirely of strictly positive vectors. This result will come in handy below when we characterize the equilibria of the three-stage game (see Theorem 1). The second part establishes that, given the Sorting Assumption, if a deterministic RSW allocation is interim efficient with respect to beliefs 17 then it remains interim efficient when we modify the model by deleting the top-most types of principal (and renormalizing the remaining probabilities appropriately).
EQUILIBRIUM CONTRACTS
We now characterize the equilibria of the contract proposal game. If the agent rejects the principal's offer, the allocation is Au'. As mentioned earlier, Au' may be exogenously given (in the case where bargaining is over the initial contract) or result from a prior contract (in the case of renegotiation). Let "(Au') denote the RSW allocation relative to A'. The next proposition asserts that any type of principal gets at least her RSW payoff in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 5: In any equilibrium of the contract proposal game, the payoff of the type i principal is at least V,(A,1(,)).
PROOF: Choose E > 0. Suppose that the type i principal proposes the "perturbed RSW allocation" ,u= {(1Aj}71 that solves Program IIi modified so that the right-hand side of (IRb) is Ui(li4) + E and (IC) is Vi(,ui) > Vi(A') + E for 1 #j. Because indifference curves for different types are never mutually tangent, these constraints can be satisfied if E is sufficiently small.22 Such a contract gives the principal the discretion to choose among the A 7's, and the type j principal will surely choose ,ui. If the agent accepts the proposal, therefore he obtains more than his reservation utility whatever the principal's type. Hence the agent will accept the proposal. Since this is true for all 8, a lower bound on the type i principal utility is Vi(Ai(,)).
Q.E.D.
REMARK: Proposition 5 illustrates a difference between our contract proposal game and the Spence (1974) education model: since, in the latter model, the screening variable (education) is chosen before contracting, the employee may not be able to guarantee herself the RSW payoff relative to the no-trade position. If we interpret y as education and t as wage in Figure 1 , the RSW allocation is the least-cost-separating point {2l, A2)2}. But there are equilibria in which the employee chooses a level of education, and then proposes a wage such that her type 1 allocation is a1l and her type 2 allocation 1A2 is to the northeast of A2 on the locus U2 = 0 (so that V2(Au2) < V2(A2)). The reason such points can be equilibria in Spence's model is that the type-2 employee could be mistaken for a type 1 if she chose the level of education corresponding to A 2. In our framework, by contrast, the type 2 employee can include the option Al in 22 To see this, note that, for any interior pair (y, t) and e small enough, the nontangency of indifference curves implies that we can find {(y1, t1)}gn1 such that, for all i, (y1,t1) is within e of (y, t) and V1(y1, t1)> V1(yi, t') + e for all j. the contract to guarantee that the firm does not suffer if it unluckily mistakes a low-productivity employee for a high-productivity one.
Our main result of this section establishes that the set of equilibrium allocations consists of incentive compatible allocations that weakly Pareto dominate the RSW allocation and are feasible for prior beliefs H1. Q.E.D.
APPLICATION 1: INITIAL CONTRACTS
A. Equilibrium Contracts
If no previous contract is in force at the time of negotiation, we simply interpret ,uO to be the allocation that arises if the principal and agent fail to sign a contract. Hence, from Theorem 1 we immediately obtain the following proposition. 
B. Refinements
When the RSW allocation associated with the reservation allocation is not interim efficient, the theory implicitly makes a continuum of alternative predictions about the outcome. However, one may feel (although we ourselves are agnostic about this) that some of these outcomes are more reasonable than others and so advocate the use of an equilibrium refinement. In this section and the next, we will focus on two widely used refinements for extensive form games, those of Cho-Kreps ( 
REMARK: Observe that, if the Sorting Assumption (including the unboundedness condition in part (i)) is satisfied, then any allocation is automatically interior and (iv) holds. (Since in some applications y and t may not be unbounded in both directions, one may have corner solutions.) Hence, in this case, we can conclude that (a) the RSW allocation passes the FGP criterion if and only if it is IE and (b) no other allocation passes the FGP criterion. Note too, that, when n > 3 and the RSW allocation is not interim efficient we require both (ii) and (iii) to show that any CK allocation must be RSW, whereas only the former condition is required to show that no FGP allocation exists.
The proof of Proposition 7 is in Maskin-Tirole (1990b). The result for the CK criterion selection has a familiar flavor thanks to the work of Cho-Kreps and Cho-Sobel (1987), and the same is true for the logic behind it (see Section 6B for the intuition). Note, however, that our framework differs from the earlier papers in that the sender's message is a contract proposal (rather than a one-dimensional signal), and reservation utilities may be decreasing (rather than constant).
APPLICATION 2: RENEGOTIATION
A. Renegotiation-proof Allocations
We now assume that the reservation allocation ,uA corresponds to a previous contract. More precisely, we suppose that the two parties are initially bound by a contract that specifies that the principal can choose from the menu {,l . ... ,IAn i.e., the contract is a direct revelation mechanism. (We discuss below how our results are changed when more general initial contracts are allowed.) The principal's contract proposal is, therefore, an offer to renegotiate.24 In this context, the agent's priors are his beliefs about the principal at the time of renegotiation.
Even in a world where parties can costlessly sign and enforce long-term contracts that are contingent on all observables, the contract they would sign if they could commit themselves not to renegotiate is generally time-inconsistent. That is, at some stage in the execution of this full-commitment contract, the parties might mutually benefit from renegotiation. Because any renegotiation can alternatively be built into the initial contract itself, characterizing the set of allocations that can arise when renegotiation is possible amounts to characterizing the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. 25 When only one party has private information at the renegotiation stage, it is often assumed that the uninformed party (in our model, the agent) proposes the new contract. This assumption ensures that the contract proposal itself does not reveal information. Naturally, giving full bargaining power to the uninformed party at the renegotiation stage is extreme. One wishes to know how alternative distributions of power (specifically, permitting the informed party to propose the new contract) affect the outcome of the overall agency relationship. We now examine this question in our principal-agent framework. 25 The concept of a "renegotiation-proof contract" (see below for formal definitions) differs from the "durable decision rule" of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) . Roughly, a durable decision rule is a contract with the property that any exogenously proposed alternative mechanism would be vetoed (where one veto suffices to stick to the initial decision rule). The exogeneity implies that, in general, only outsiders can lead the renegotiation. Furthermore, Holmstrom and Myerson assume that the parties do not update their beliefs in case of veto. This latter assumption is problematic because the parties' beliefs, in general, affect the way they will execute the original contract and their payoffs from that contract. These payoffs, in turn, influence the decision whether or not to veto. 26 Notice that in our framework we allow only one opportunity for renegotiation. Thus, if the agent rejects the principal's renegotiating proposal, she cannot make another offer.
DEFINITION:
An allocation ,A' corresponding to DRM mO is strongly renegotiation-proof if it is weakly renegotiation proof and there exists no equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which the contract is renegotiated (i.e., in which the equilibrium outcome is other than pj').
Thus, a strongly renegotiation-proof contract is certain not to be renegotiated, whereas one that is only weakly renegotiation-proof may or may not be, depending on which equilibrium of the renegotiation game is selected. The next two propositions demonstrate that the sets of weakly and strongly renegotiation-proof allocations have a simple structure. In accordance with Sections 2 through 4, we have concentrated so far on renegotiation where the informed party proposes the new contract (i.e., she leads the renegotiation). But we equally can examine the same game with the roles reversed (i.e., the uninformed party leads the renegotiation). A straightforward, but important corollary of Proposition 9 is as follows.
PROPOSITION 10: The strong and weak renegotiation concepts coincide when the uninformed party leads the renegotiation. Under the hypothesis of Proposition 9, an allocation is strongly renegotiation-proof when the informed party leads the renegotiation if and only if it is renegotiation-proof when the uninformed party leads the renegotiation.
That is, if strong renegotiation-proofness is the "appropriate" version of renegotiation-proofness, it does not matter whether the informed or uninformed party has the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage. The set of ex-ante implementable allocations is the same in both cases.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
10: When the uninformed party proposes the contract, he chooses an allocation that maximizes his expected payoff for beliefs H1 (Y2iHiUi(,ui)) given the informed party's individual rationality constraints (VW(,ui)> V'(,4It) for all i) and incentive compatibility constraints (VW(,ui)> V'(,Ai) for all i and j). His choice is thus interim-efficient. Conversely, from the reasoning of Proposition 9, an interim-efficient allocation is (strongly) renegotiation-proof regardless of the bargaining process.
Q.E.D.
We have focused so far on initial allocations that result from direct revelation mechanisms. Although such contracts are especially appealing (because of their simplicity), we can readily consider arbitrary initial mechanisms.
Suppose that we redefine an allocation ,A' to be strongly renegotiation-proof (SRP) if there exists a contract mo whose unique equilibrium outcome is ,A' and such that, if mO is the initial contract, mo is not renegotiated in any equilibrium. Clearly, any allocation ,uA that was SRP under the earlier definition (i.e., any interim-efficient allocation) remains so, since we can always take mo to be the direct revelation mechanism ,ut.28 Moreover, it is easy to see that the new definition does not admit any new SRP allocations. Indeed, suppose ,aL is an SRP allocation and let mo be an initial contract relative to which ,uL is the unique equilibrium outcome of the renegotiation game. If contrary to the claim, ,ut is not interim-efficient, then there exists a Pareto-dominating and incentivecompatible allocation ,ut that is individually rational for prior beliefs H1. We shall construct an equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which the equilibrium outcome is /,u a contradiction. Specifically, on the equilibrium path, let all types of principal propose the direct revelation mechanism associated with ,u and let the agent accept this proposal. If the principal proposes any other contract (including mo), assign the corresponding continuation equilibrium from the equilibrium giving rise to ,ut. Such a deviation is, therefore, deterred since by deviating the type i principal gets at most V1(12 ) ( k V1(,&)) . Summarizing, we have the following proposition.
28 This is not to say, however, that just because a contract gives rise to an interim-efficient allocation, it will not be renegotiated. We are making the assertion only for direct revelation mechanisms. PROPOSITION 9*: An allocation is SRP in the redefined sense if and only if it is SRP in the original sense.
The story is quite different when we consider general initial contracts and weak renegotiation-proofness. Redefine an allocation A'0 to be weakly renegotiation-proof (WRP) if there exists a contract mo and an allocation 1t' and such that, if m0 is the initial contract, ,.C is an equilibrium outcome of the renegotiation game. As with strong renegotiation-proofness, any allocation that was WRP in the original sense (i.e., a weakly interim efficient allocation) is WRP with respect to general initial contracts. However, an allocation need not be WIE to be WRP in the new sense. This is because a general initial contract could have equilibrium outcomes other than '.C that can be used as "threats" to prevent even a highly inefficient allocation from being renegotiated. Indeed, if there exists a desirable good that can be transferred from one party to another in unlimited quantities (as when the Sorting Assumption is imposed), weak renegotiation-proofness is unrestrictive: We should stress that, although Proposition 8* shows that considerable inefficiency may occur despite the possibility of renegotiation, such inefficiency depends crucially on the choice of a particular continuation equilibrium in the renegotiation game should the principal propose an alternative contract. Thus, although inefficiency may arise, it is by no means guaranteed.
B. Refinements
As in Section 5, we apply the refinement of Cho-Kreps (1987) (CK) and that of Farrell (1985) and Grossman-Perry (1986) (FGP). An incentive compatible allocation , is "weakly Cho-Kreps renegotiation proof" (weakly CK-RP) if there exists an equilibrium of the renegotiation game (in which the principal leads the renegotiation) that passes the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion and results in ,u It is "strongly Cho-Kreps renegotiation proof" (strongly CK-RP) if there exists a unique equilibrium of the renegotiation game that passes the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, and if this equilibrium results in j,u. The definitions of "'weakly-" and "strongly Farrell-Grossman-Perry renegotiation proof" allocations (weakly-and strongly FGP-RP allocations) are analogous.
Refinements of PBE cannot expand the set of weakly renegotiation proof allocations, because they make it harder to sustain an equilibrium; nor, as Proposition 11 establishes below, does the CK or FGP refinement reduce the set of strongly renegotiation-proof allocations under the hypotheses of Proposition 7. Hence, the pertinent question is whether a refinement induces a greater coincidence of the sets of weakly and strongly renegotiation proof allocations than does unrefined PBE. As Proposition 11 shows, in fact, exact coincidence obtains for the CK and FGP refinements.
PROPOSITION 11: Suppose that for any WIE allocation A' there exist strictly positive beliefs relative to which ,ut is IE. The sets of weakly and strongly renegotiation-proof allocations (when the initial contract is a DRM) for unrefined PBE and the Cho-Kreps and FGP refinements are given in Table I. PROOF: See Maskin-Tirole (1990b).
Proposition 11 sheds light on a result due to Nosal (1988) . Nosal considers a model in which two parties sign an enforceable contract under symmetric information. One of the two parties then receives private information and can offer to renegotiate the contract. Nosal shows that the optimal contract when renegotiation is prohibited is robust when renegotiation is feasible. The link between this result and Proposition 11 is that an optimal contract in the absence of renegotiation is necessarily interim-efficient and therefore (strongly) renegotiation proof from Proposition 11.
The reason why the CK criterion has no power to reduce the set of weakly renegotiation proof allocations is easily grasped from Figure 4 , which depicts the compensation example with n = 2 and U0 = U = 0 for all i. The allocation L2*} is weakly interim efficient (/ut* is ex-post efficient, and therefore cannot be improved on for the type-1 principal without lowering U1; and ,LL* cannot be improved upon for the type-2 principal without violating incentive compatibility or lowering U2, as the shaded region is to the northwest of the line U2(p2) = U2(,U2) )). Note also that U2(/12 ) > 0 and U 1Q(tl* ) < 0. Suppose that {pL2, ,u2* } is a candidate equilibrium allocation, but that the principal proposes the outcome /L2 (see Figure 4) and Vl(,a2) < V1Q.t1*). Hence, the CK criterion postulates that the agent when confronting contract proposal ,a2 should believe that the principal's type is 2. If the parties are not yet bound by an initial contract (as in Section 5), the agent accepts proposal ,a2 since U2(,u2) > 0, and thus the candidate equilibrium {,, 2, } is upset. Suppose, by contrast, that the two parties have already signed contract {,U1*, ,2*}. The no-renegotiation equilibrium passes the CK criterion: Proposing /L2 "convinces" the agent that the principal has type 2, but this new contract is rejected by the agent since U2(pL2) < U2(42). Let us briefly consider how Proposition 11 is affected when the initial contract can be a general mechanism rather than only a DRM. From Proposition 8* the set of weakly renegotiation-proof allocations is just the set of incentive compatible allocations. The other entries in Table I We first show that the equilibrium set of this screening game is very large, but then note that some equilibria are not robust to a simple modification of the model, where the informed party is given some influence over the contract. We conclude that the equilibrium allocations in this modified model coincide with those in the signaling model of Section 5. Proposition 12 shows that the equilibrium set of this screening model includes allocations for which the IP's payoff is actually lower than in the RSW allocation for the null trade. The possibility of such low payoffs, however, is a knife-edge result that depends on the IP's having no power to influence the contract proposal. Intuitively, if she had even only slight influence, she ought to be able to exploit the Bertrand competition between the UP's to attain her RSW payoff.
One way of formalizing this intuition is to suppose that there is a large number N of uninformed parties who play with the informed party the following variant of the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game. At each date t = 1,..., i, the informed party makes a contract proposal to the uninformed parties (and chooses randomly among them if several accept). Then at dates t = m+ 1, ... I, mI + mu the uninformed parties make simultaneous contract proposals to the informed party (who accepts one of them or rejects them all). Then at dates m, + mu + 1 ..., 2m, + mu, the informed party makes proposals again, etc. The parties discount the future with discount factor 8 = e -rT per period (where T is the interval between bargaining dates). The game ends once a contract proposal is accepted. The payoffs to the informed party and the chosen uninformed party are 5tVi(,i) and 8tUi(,i), where t is the date of agreement and ,ut the outcome resulting from the contract. Suppose that bargaining occurs quickly (T -* 0). Note that if mu/lm is large, the informed party has perhaps little bargaining power. 32 We claim that in this bargaining game the informed party can closely approximate her RSW payoff. Suppose that, when it is her turn, she proposes an incentive-compatible allocation near the RSW allocation but where the UP's payoff is U + E regardless of the IP's type. An uninformed party's utility from accepting this proposal is-U+ U . However, there is an upper bound on how much utility the uninformed parties can obtain in the aggregate if everyone rejects this proposal (because of the informed party's individual rationality constraint). Therefore in any continuation equilibrium corresponding to rejection, at least one UP must obtain less than U + E because he has many competitors ("many competitors" is a large number that depends on 8, but not on T). Thus he will accept the informed party's proposal, and so the RSW payoff is an approximate lower bound for the informed party when she proposes a contract. As long as T is near 0, this payoff is also an approximate lower bound at the beginning of the bargaining game.
Conversely, one can show that any incentive-compatible allocation that is individually rational (for beliefs H ) and Pareto dominates the RSW allocation for the null trade allocation is an equilibrium of the bargaining game. The proof is essentially a combination of those for Theorem 1 and Proposition 12. We thus conclude with Proposition 13. for all i. Conversely, for any T, any allocation characterized in Proposition 6 is an equilibrium allocation of the bargaining game.
BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Up to now we have assumed that the agent-the party who accepts or rejects the contract proposal-has no private information himself. However, the case of bilateral asymmetric information is of course important in practice. A firm with private information about its environment or technology may offer a labor contract to an employee with private information about his ability, or the reverse. A manufacturer with private information about her product's quality may price discriminate among consumers with different preferences. Or a franchiser with information about quality and therefore aggregate demand for her product may offer a contract to a franchisee with private information about his talent or about local demand. There is an important special case in which many of our results continue to hold even when the agent has private information. The leading feature of this case is that, in addition to the Sorting Assumption being satisfied, parties have quasi-linear utility functions.
This section is organized as follows. We first generalize the notions of weakly interim efficient (WIE*), Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW*), and interim efficient (IE*) allocations to bilateral asymmetric information. We then note that Theorem 1, the assertion that the equilibrium allocations are exactly those that dominate the RSW allocation and are incentive compatible and individually rational (for prior beliefs H1) provided that the RSW allocation is IE for some strictly positive beliefs H; carries over to bilateral asymmetric information. The problem is then to find sufficient conditions that guarantee that the RSW* allocation is IE* for some such beliefs. At this point, we specialize the model to -the agents) may also have private information even when utility is not quasi-linear. Myerson defines an allocation to be "incentive compatible typeby-type" or "safe" if it is incentive compatible when the agents know the principal's true type. A "strong solution" is an allocation that is safe and interim-efficient (i.e., undominated for the different types of principal in the class of incentive compatible allocations). In our restricted framework, incentive compatibility and incentive compatibility type-by-type amount to the agent's being willing to accept to play the mechanism (individual rationality) when he has prior beliefs about, and he knows, the principal's type, respectively. Thus for an initial allocation A,, the RSW allocation ,^'(A't) is safe by definition, and is a strong solution if and only if it is interim-efficient. 34 Myerson then briefly analyzes the noncooperative game in which the principal offers a mechanism (Section 5) and shows that an equilibrium exists and that any strong solution, if one exists, is an equilibrium. These results mean in our context that ,(1ij) is an equilibrium outcome if it is interim-efficient. Myerson's general observation that equilibria are not generally unique even when a strong solution exists (p. 1781) does not apply to our more structured model; our Theorem 1 indicates that "u(A't) is the unique equilibrium outcome when it is interim-efficient, i.e., when a strong solution exists. Our Theorem 1 also fully characterizes the equilibrium set when the RSW allocation is not interim-efficient.
After discussing the noncooperative game, Myerson goes on to develop a cooperative approach. He first identifies a subset of interim-efficient allocations, core allocations. He then isolates a subset of core allocations, neutral allocations, or mechanisms that forms the smallest class satisfying four axioms. In particular, neutral mechanisms must include strong solutions if such exist, and the set of neutral mechanisms cannot expand if the set of public actions (actions that can be contractually specified) becomes larger. He proves existence of and characterizes neutral mechanisms. In our context, when ,(/x') is interim-efficient, it is the unique neutral solution as it is undominated, and thus is the unique core solution. showed that inequality (2) leads to contradiction. Hence Uy(9" t") = U4' as well. We next claim that t(( Fk)),= 1 is incentive compatible. Again, the proof is by induction.
Suppose that the claim has been established for n -1. For n, we must show that Vy(9 , tF) > Vk(9n, F") and V A(9", ") > Vn(9k, f/k) for all k < n -1. Now, the former inequality follows from 
